has been on a long overdue offensive  against the n Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) group since 20 January.

aims to retake the city of Afrin and its surrounding climes, which would undoubtedly prove to be a gamechanger in northern , and may even assist in the stabilisation of the last major rebel-held enclave in Idlib.’s advance has allowed it to secure its border from YPG presence all the way to Jarablus, which was snatched away from Islamic State (IS) extremists during Operation Euphrates Shield back in 2016.

has all but sealed off the pocket apart from Assad regime-held territory near Aleppo, there are signs that Operation Olive Branch – the codename for ’s offensive – might be reaching a critical stage as the YPG attempts to cut deals with third parties to survive.

In its desperation to defend against the joint Turkish and (FSA) onslaught, and with its front lines methodically collapsing, the YPG agreed to allow Assad regime troops and allied pro-Iran Shia militias into nearby Tell Rifaat. n state media then showed footage of regime soldiers inside Tell Rifaat.

The Russian factor

The YPG’s play here is to partially concede to the Assad regime territory it knows it stands a high chance of losing if it attempts to hold it unilaterally against ’s steady advance.

In other words, the YPG – which claims to champion Kurdish independence in and beyond – has issued a call to help to subordinate themselves to a regime they claim to oppose, and one which savagely oppressed the Kurdish people for decades, and all just to keep it out of Turkish-backed FSA hands.

This is not the first time that the YPG has callously prioritised their relationship with the n regime over the n people, who have been struggling for their freedom since 2011.

From the very start of the n revolution, the revolutionaries have been undermined by the YPG that has selfishly sold them out to make greedy land grabs. In 2012, with the Assad regime on the ropes, the regime cut a deal with the YPG that saw it withdraw from many Kurdish-claimed territories. The Assad regime suddenly decided to withdraw without firing a single shot.

 The YPG is once again cutting deals with the regime to the detriment of what is left of the n revolution

must take quickly

Fast forward to today, and the YPG is once again cutting deals with the regime to the detriment of what is left of the n revolution. As Russia and Iran have decisively intervened on behalf of the regime, and with the revolution all but decimated as the people of Eastern Ghouta get fed into Assad’s meat grinder, has sought to bring as much territory under at least nominal regime control as possible.

Prior to the launch of , Russia made an offer to the YPG to transfer territory under its control back to the regime, perhaps with a future understanding about providing them with autonomy or some kind of federal system.

The YPG spurned the Russians, which was perhaps a costly error, as it gave an incentive to accommodate ’s plans.

Knowing that was eager to secure its border from any further YPG threat, and also sighting an opportunity to further undermine an already strained relationship between and , Russia agreed to withdraw its forces from and to allow Turkish airpower to operate over the enclave.

Turkey Needs to Win Afrin Quickly

If is left in the hands of the regime, then Idlib too will be all but lost

It seems apparent that has decided to punish the YPG by allowing and its n allies to pummel the Kurdish Marxists and threaten their very existence in north western , which would then force them to agree to Russia’s terms.

Following the YPG’s loss of territory, including Rajo which lies on a major road leading to itself, it seems obvious that they would seek to secure Tell Rifaat to prevent the pocket from being sealed off on all sides.

Also, by allowing the regime into these territories, the YPG aims to convince Russia that it now has to lean on to get it to accept regime control over , something Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has suggested would be acceptable to Ankara.

However, the force concentration of Assad regime troops and allied militias appears to be small, and the YPG has indicated that it is not yet willing to cede control politically to the regime, which means is unlikely to restrain just yet.

It is in ’s interests to capture and commit more military resources – including an increase in the number of Turkish forces deployed – to speed up the process of taking .

Rather than the city being besieged within days, as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said last month, it has now been a month and a half since the start of operations.

is rightly concerned about the domestic impact of losing too many soldiers, but without a rapid and decisive victory soon, the YPG may find a way to survive by conceding to Russian and Assad regime demands.

If this happens, Turkish citizens will not be safer, as the n regime has a long history of aiding and abetting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group considered terrorists by the , European Union and , and which insists is equivalent to the YPG.

Should the YPG become subsumed into the regime, Assad is unlikely to forget ’s support for the rebels and will be seeking revenge and to destabilise domestically.

This will mean an increased output in PKK attacks, and the YPG will be used as an auxiliary force alongside the plethora of pro-Iran militias to support the n military in crushing the rebellion.

If is left in the hands of the regime, then Idlib too will be all but lost, and will have an extremely bitter regime looking to undermine and harm it right on its southern border, and in areas where there is already a high concentration of PKK/YPG activity. is on the clock, and it must do everything it can to prevent the YPG coming to an accord with the regime, which will encourage Russia to call time on .This would be almost as disastrous an outcome as losing the battle for altogether, and would have deadly consequences for for years to come.